In this paper, we discuss the apportionment problem of distributing seats in a legislature, based proportionally on the population of electoral districts or on the vote totals of political parties. If an apportionment method can be defined via discrete optimization, then its continuous relaxation should have an ideally proportional solution (i.e., the quota) at optimality. First, we propose a new class of reasonable methods of apportionment satisfying such a property. Then we study symmetries of five apportionment methods in the new class. Finally, we estimate how often the five methods stay within the quota.
Introduction
In most of the countries, seats are allocated to parties or regions proportionally to their respective vote totals or to their respective populations. In Japan, we have 480 seats in the House of Representatives. Out of the 480 seats, 300 seats are for the single-seat constituency system and they are allocated to the 47 prefectures proportionally to their populations. And the remaining 180 seats are for the proportional representation system and they are allocated to the 11 electoral districts proportionally to their populations. In the U.S., the 435 seats of the House of Representatives are allocated to the 50 states proportionally to their populations.
Allocating seats proportionally may seem easy, but in fact it is not. Ideally, for example, Iowa is entitled to 4.532 seats according to the 2000 populations. If Iowa gets 5 seats, then she is overrepresented. Otherwise, if Iowa gets 4 seats, then she is underrepresented. Since the number of seats must be integral, perfect proportionality cannot be achieved. Then, some people might come up with some rule of rounding these perfectly proportional values up or down to a neighboring integer so that all the seats are allocated. Some countries use apportionment methods obeying such a rule, one of which is the Hamilton method or the method of greatest remainders. In Japan, we have used the Hamilton method as a "proportional" apportionment method since 1947. In these apportionment methods including the Hamilton method, each state, region or party can get reasonable seats where the difference is at most one between its given seats and its perfect proportional value (conventionally it is called the quota). In other words, any reasonable apportionment method should "stay within the quota." To express mathematically, staying within the quota requires
where q i is the quota of state or party i and a i is the number of seats assigned to state or party i. However, the Hamilton method gives rise to the so-called "Alabama paradox" which would have given Alabama 8 seats with a house size of 299 and 7 seats with a house size of 300. At the very least, the Hamilton method is not proportional in the light of the Alabama paradox. Surprisingly, all such apportionment methods of rounding up or down quotas turn out to meet with nonsensical paradoxes.
Balinski and Young [1] proved that no apportionment method can avoid nonsensical paradoxes except for socalled "divisor" methods. However we encounter another difficulty, in other words, there is no divisor method that always stays within the quota. Section 2 describes divisor methods and Section 3 defines a new class of "relaxedly proportional" methods. In Section 4 we study the chance of violating quota for five relaxedly proportional methods. And we try to find which one stays within the quota as often as possible. Let s denote the number of states, h ≥ s + 1 the total number of seats to be apportioned, or house size, p = (p 1 , . . . , p s ) > 0 a vector of populations, and a = (a 1 , . . . , a s ) ≥ 0 a vector of nonnegative integers. The vector a is called an apportionment of h if i a i = h.
Divisor methods
We next introduce a divisor method M and a divisor x > 0. A divisor means a notional ratio of population to seat. If we have
seats where p i /x is referred to as the quotient of state i. Given p, h ≥ s+1, and d(a), we define a divisor method M as the set of apportionments
If d(0) = 0, then the assumption h ≥ s + 1 means a i ≥ 1 for all i and a j ≥ 2 for at least one j. This leads the famous min-max relation due to Balinski and Young [1] .
and
. Then the relation above still holds. Though we can define innumerable divisor methods, the following methods are called five historical methods and have received special treatment for a long time:
• 
Relaxedly proportional methods
Let N denote the set of nonnegative integers and p the total of all populations: p = i p i . It is well known that the Webster method yields solutions that minimize
2 subject to the same constraints is an apportionment in the Webster method, for the details see [1] .
Noticing that
we have the Webster problem which minimizes
Now consider its continuous relaxation minimizing
where R + denotes the set of positive real numbers. Then we can have some positive λ > 0 such that
for all i at optimality, which means a i is proportional to p i for all i at optimality. In other words, a i = (λ/2)p i = (h/p)p i = q i at optimality. Then, we say the Webster method is relaxedly proportional.
Inversely, if we consider the relation p i /a i = const., which means undoubtedly that p i is proportional to a i , then we can obtain another objective function: p i /a i da i = p i log a i + C where C is an integral constant. Since the function p i log a i is concave, we have an apportionment problem which maximizes
where N + denotes the set of positive integers. This apportionment problem was considered by Theil and Schrage as said before. So we call this problem as T&S for short. The apportionment method (also denoted by T&S) defined by this problem is a divisor method with a rounding criteria: d(0) = 0 and d(a) = 1/ log((a + 1)/a) for all integers a ≥ 1.
The relation a i /p i = const. is equivalent to the relation log(a i /p i ) + 1 = const., which yields (log(a i /p i ) + 1)da i = a i log(a i /p i )+C. Since the function a i log(a i /p i ) is convex, we have another apportionment problem which minimizes
This apportionment problem was proposed by Theil as said before. The Theil method defined by this problem is a divisor method with a rounding criteria: d(0) = 1/e ≈ 0.37 and d(a) = (1/e)(a+1) a+1 /a a for all integers a ≥ 1. Moreover, it is also known that the Hill method yields solutions that minimize i a i (p i /a i − p/h) 2 subject to i a i = h and a i ∈ N + for all i. Conversely, any solution that minimizes i a i (p i /a i − p/h) 2 subject to the same constraints is an apportionment in the Hill method.
Since
we obtain the Hill problem which minimizes
and its continuous relaxation minimizing
i a i = h and a i ∈ R + for all i.
Then we can have some negative λ < 0 such that
for all i at optimality, which means a i is proportional to p i for all i at optimality, namely, the Hill method is also relaxedly proportional.
And again, inversely, if we consider the relation (a i /p i ) 2 = const., then we have the following objective
We can prove that the apportionment method defined by this problem is a divisor method with a rounding criteria: d(a) = a 2 + a + 1/3 for all integers a ≥ 0. As far as the author knows, this rounding criteria is new. We call this divisor method as the "1/3" method. From what is said above, we have the following theorem: Theorem 1 The Webster, T&S, Theil, Hill and "1/3" methods are all relaxedly proportional.
Next we will state another theorem with its proof. Theorem 2 The "1/3" method is a divisor method.
Proof Let a minimize i x 3 i /p 2 i subject to the constraints: i x i = h and x i ∈ N for all i. Then we have the relation:
for any i with a i ≥ 1 and any j with j = i. Or,
Since a 2 i − a i + 1/3 > 0, we can rewrite as follows:
for any i : a i ≥ 1 and any j : j = i, which means that a is an apportionment in the 1/3 method.
Conversely, assume a an apportionment in the 1/3 method, which satisfies the above relations. Namely,
where a i ≥ 1 and j = i. Obviously, 3a 
Then we have j∈G c j = i∈L c i letting α = j∈G c j . Then it follows from the preceding α inequalities that
Then we can get what follows:
This means that the apportionment a minimizes i x 3 i /p 2 i subject to the same constraints as before.
(QED)
Theorem 3 The Adams method is not relaxedly proportional.
Proof The Adams method can be defined by the optimization problem which minimizes
with its continuous relaxation minimizing
where we have some λ such that (2a i − 1)/p i = λ for all i at optimality, or a i = (λ/2)p i + 0.5 for all i at optimality. This means that the Adams method is not relaxedly proportional and it favors the small states or parties because state or party i gets additive 0.5 seats regardless of its population size.
Similarly, we have the following theorems:
Theorem 4 The Jefferson and Dean methods are not relaxedly proportional.
Theorem 5 The Dean method favors the small states or parties.
Theorem 6 The Hamilton method is relaxedly proportional.
Proof The Hamilton method minimizes
i a i = h and a i ∈ N for all i, and its continuous relaxation has an optimal solution a = q.
Since the Hamilton method suffers from nonsensical paradoxes, we strongly claim that an apportionment method should be not only a relaxedly proportional method but also a divisor method. 
Staying within the quota
Balinski and Young study how often five historical divisor methods produce apportionments that violate quota. They assume the 50 states and a fixed apportionment of the 435 seats according to the 1970 populations for each of the five methods. Let method M define an apportionment a = a(M ) and a divisor x = x(a(M )). Let P i be uniformly distributed on the inter-
, then the apportionment method M gives the same apportionment a(M ) for the populations P 1 , . . . , P s as for the 1970 populations. To avoid the unrealistic assumption of very small states, they assume in estimating the likelihood of violating quota that no state's quotient is less than 0.5. In other words, they assume that the populations are uniformly distributed on the interval max{0.
Especially in the proportional representation system, many nations explicitly prescribe that parties with very small vote totals should not obtain any seat at all in order to keep a stable administration. They estimate the probability of violating quota for each of the five historical divisor methods, see Table 1 where the number of instances is counted in which some state violates quota by Monte Carlo simulation and each entry denotes the expected number per 1,000 problems. The methods of Adams and Jefferson can be seen to violate quota virtually all the time. Considering that they are not relaxedly proportional, this result seems reasonable. Also, though the Dean method is not relaxedly proportional either, its expected number is rather small but relatively much larger than those of the methods of Hill and Webster. By contrast, the Webster method virtually never violates quota with the probability of 0.00061.
We will do almost the same as they do. But we will first remove three methods of Adams, Jefferson and Dean which are not relaxedly proportional from five historical methods. Instead of them we will add three methods of T&S, Theil and "1/3" where T&S and "1/3" are mirror images of the methods of Webster and Hill, respectively. The meaning of mirror images is as follows. The objective function of the Webster problem is a 2 i /p i whose relaxation has the relations a i /p i = const. for all i at optimality, whereas the T&S problem has the objective function p i log a i whose relaxation has the relations p i /a i = const. for all i at optimality, where we note that p i /a i is the inverse of a i /p i . In addition, the Hill problem has the objective function p 2 i /a i whose relaxation has the relations (p i /a i ) 2 = const. or p i /a i = const. for all i at optimality whereas the "1/3" problem has the objective function a tion a i log(a i /p i ) whose relaxation has the relations log(a i /p i ) + 1 = const. or a i /p i = const. for all i at optimality. Because the relation log(a i /p i ) + 1 = const. is equivalent to 1 − log(p i /a i ) = const. or p i /a i = const., the Theil method has the mirror image of itself.
We use ten sets of populations from 1910 through 2000 and produce 10
6 problems for each method and each set of populations. We estimate the probability of violating quota for each of the new five which are not only divisor methods but also relaxedly proportional methods. See Table 2 where each entry denotes the expected number per 1,000 problems.
In general, these five methods give very small probabilities from 0.735×10 −3 (Webster) through 2.919×10 −3
(Hill) on average, the latter probability is almost 4 times larger than the former one. This result might indicate that we have found one of the relaxedly proportional divisor methods which has the smallest probability of violating quota, namely, the Webster method.
Conclusion
We have proposed relaxedly proportional apportionment methods. They satisfy an exceedingly natural property: If an apportionment method can be described in the form of discrete optimization, then the continuous relaxation should have an optimal solution identical to the quota. Surprisingly, some famous methods (including the methods of Adams, Dean and Jefferson) are found to be not relaxedly proportional. Since the class of relaxedly proportional methods includes infinite apportionment methods, we have selected five methods out of them, considering the symmetry of them. And we have studied how often these five methods stay within the quota. The Webster method turns out to have the largest probability of staying within the quota among them.
